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sexual acts. the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has clearly stated that no such 
right exists for the sexual acts of consent-
ing, unmarried, heterosexual adults. 
According to the court, the right to 
privacy for sexual acts applies only to mar-
ried adults. 
- Leo]. Keenan, III 
Niroo v. Niroo: 
ANTICIPATED RENEWAL 
COMMISSIONS ON INSURANCE 
POLICIES SOLD BY A SPOUSE 
DURING TIlE MARRIAGE ARE 
MARITAL PROPERTY 
In Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 
35 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that anticipated renewal 
commissions on insurance policies sold by 
a spouse during the marriage but accruing 
after the marriage are marital property 
within the meaning of the Property Dispo-
sition in Divorce Annulment Act (the 
Act), Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §8-201(e) 
(1984). 
The Niroos were married in 1977. In 
1978, Mr. Niroo became an insurance 
salesman for Pennsylvania Life Insurance 
Company (penn Life), where he received 
commissions on individual policies sold. In 
1980, he entered into agency manager 
agreements with Penn Life and the Execu-
tive Fund Life Insurance Company. Under 
these agreements, Mr. Niroo shared in the 
profits and the losses of the company. The 
agreements entitled him to receive income 
derived from net profits generated from 
the renewal of insurance policies. Further-
more, the contracts specified that the hus-
band's right to these renewal commissions 
"shall be vested in him even if he is perma-
nently and totally disabled, or after his 
death in his heirs and assigns." 313 Md. at 
229, 545 A.2d at 36. 
At trial, Mr. Niroo contended that the 
commissions were not marital property as 
defined by the Act. Alternatively, he con-
tended that if the commissions were deem-
ed marital property, then the value of the 
commissions were offset by advances he 
had drawn against future commissions 
which should properly have been con-
strued as marital property. The trial judge 
disagreed on both counts, holding the 
commissions were marital property and 
that the debt he had incurred could not be 
offset against the commissions. The court 
awarded Mrs. Niroo a $200,000 monetary 
award.Id. at 229-30, 545 A.2d at 37. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari in this case prior to the 
case's consideration by the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland in order to "con-
sider the important question involved in 
this case." Id. at 230, 545 A.2d at 37. On 
appeal, Mr. Niroo asserted that the "spe-
culative and contingent nature of these 
commissions" rendered him a tenuous 
property interest which was not within 
the definition of marital property as con-
templated by the legislature in section 8-
201(e). Id. at 232, 545 A.2d at 38. Because 
he had to "work" these accounts through 
activities which would take place after the 
marriage was dissolved, Mr. Niroo argued 
that the commissions were not "acquired" 
during the marriage. He therefore con-
tended that "the classification of renewal 
commissions as marital property would 
improperly give his former wife the fruits 
of his future efforts and would penalize 
him if the renewal commissions were not 
realized." Id. 
The court of appeals did not agree, and 
it affirmed the holding of the trial court 
that the commissions were marital proper-
ty. It reiterated its conclusion that the Act 
significantly changed traditional notions 
of property rights between spouses and 
broadened the concept of marital proper-
ty.Id. at 229, 545 A.2d at 37. Marital prop-
erty may be "'construed to include 
obligations, rights and other intangibles as 
well as physical things.'" Id. at 233, 545 
A.2d at 38 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 
Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, (1942». The 
proper analysis to determine marital prop-
erty was, "first, to decide whether the 
property right was acquired during the 
marriage and second, whether it is equita-
ble to include it as marital property, 
without regard to whether the right is 
vested or not." Niroo at 233, 545 A.2d at 
38-39 (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 
115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981». Despite Mr. 
Niroo's claim that after the dissolution of 
the marriage he must still "service" these 
accounts in order to realize the renewal 
commissions, the court held that "[t]he 
husband's primary effort was expended in 
acquiring the original policies." Niroo at 
235, 545 A.2d at 40. Furthermore, the 
court of appeals referred to the evidence 
presented at trial which showed that the 
commissions were not found to be spe-
culative. Evidence showed that "72% of 
existing policies will be automatically 
renewed after the first year; 82% ... the 
second year; and 88% will be renewed 
thereafter." Id. Thus, the court held that 
the property right to these commissions 
was manifestly vested during the marriage, 
and was, therefore, enforceable as marital 
property. 
Moreover, the court of appeals stated 
that it was settled that an insurance agent 
has a vested right in renewal commissions. 
Id. at 234-35,545 A.2d at 39 (citing Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 185, 
140 A. 64 (1928». Thus, "contractually 
vested rights in renewal commissions are a 
type of property interest within the defini-
tion of marital property under section 8-
201(e)." Niroo at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. This 
right was established in Mr. Niroo's agen-
cy contract with Penn Life, which provid-
ed that should he "die or become disabled, 
his right to receive the renewal commis-
sions, as well as his heirs' rights thereto, 
would not be affected." Id. at 235, 545 
A.2d at 39. The court reasoned that 
because the husband had a vested right in 
the commissions, they were a valuable 
asset "not separable from the original poli-
cies sold during the marriage, and thus 
properly a part of the couple's shared 
assets during the marriage." Id. at 237,545 
A.2d at 40. 
Although the court of appeals noted that 
the Act expanded the concept of marital 
property, the court did note that some 
rights and interests were not includable as 
marital property. Among these are an 
inchoate personal injury claim arising 
from an accident during the marriage, 
which it considered as so "uniquely per-
sonal that it could not be considered mari-
tal property 'acquired' during the marriage 
..•. " Id. at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. Also 
excluded from the definition of marital 
property was a medical degree or license, 
which the court considered a "mere 
expectancy of future enhanced income ... 
personal to the holder [and] cannot be 
transferred, pledged or inherited." Archer 
v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,357,493 A.2d 1074 
(1985). Despite Mr. Niroo's contention 
that the renewal commissions were so 
uniquely personal as to disqualify them as 
le!re 
alasing in 
ana 
killer. 
Please SUPDO,t the 
1-.. 01--: .... SOCi8.ty O~ 
~ I naameflca, Inc. 
40-The Law Forum/ 19.2 ----------------------------------
"marital propeny" under the statute, the 
court did not agree. Niroo at 237, 545 A.2d 
at 40. 
Alternatively, Mr. Niroo aruged that the 
trial coun erred in not finding that cenain 
debt that he incurred - advances received 
in the form of a loan from Penn Life -
should have been construed as marital 
debt, and thus offset against the present 
value of the commissions. This would pos-
sibly have had the effect of reducing Mrs. 
Niroo's monetary award. Although the 
court did not agree with Mr. Niroo's cal-
culations, it did agree that the advances 
were marital debts and should be offset 
against the commissions. Subsequently, 
the case was remanded for funher consid-
eration in determining the proper mone-
tary award. 
The Niroo coun is splitting judicial hairs 
on the definition of marital propeny. It 
has determined that the rights to renewal 
commissions that vested during the mar-
riage are contractual rights and are, there-
fore, enforceable as a propeny right rather 
than as a mere conditional expectation. 
The distinction to be made is that the 
court refused to recognize as marital prop-
erty earnings which were speculative and 
nontransferable, such as a medical degree 
or license; yet determined that the right to 
future earnings that vested during the 
marriage were marital property because 
they were less speculative and were 
transferable. 
- Peter T. McDowell 
Craig 'V. State: SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS 
NOT ABSOLUTE IN Clflm ABUSE 
CASES 
In Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 
A.2d 784 (1988), the Coun of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that the 
Maryland statute that allows alleged child 
abuse victims to testify over closed circuit 
television, if it is determined that testifying 
in the courtroom will so traumatize the 
child-witness that the child will be unable 
to reasonably communicate, does not vio-
late the six amendment's confrontation 
clause. 
Sandra Ann Craig was the owner and 
operator of a pre-kindergarten and kinder-
garten school in Howard County. Brooke 
Etze attended Craig's school for two years, 
had never complained to her parents of 
any abusive treatment, and her parents had 
ex:pressed satisfaction with Craig and her 
school. After reading a newspaper account 
of complaints of abuse at Craig's school, 
Mr. and Mrs. Etze attended a meeting 
hosted by Howard County's social serv-
ices and health departments. As a result of 
what they learned at the meeting, the 
Etze's had Brooke evaluated by a therapist. 
During conversations with the therapist 
and her parents, Brooke disclosed several 
incidents of abuse committed by Craig, 
two of Craig's children, and other children 
at the school. It was revealed that "[t]he 
direct abuse by Ms. Craig included kicking 
Brooke on the legs and in her 'private 
parts,' inserting a stick in her vagina, and 
threatening her with the loss of her 
parents' love." A medical examination 
confirmed sexual abuse. Id. at 255, 544 
A.2d at 786. 
Ultimately, a six-count indictment was 
returned in the Circuit Court for Howard 
County against Sandra Craig, who was 
tried and convicted of all counts in a jury 
trial. Craig appealed to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland, raising seven 
issues. The court of special appeals found 
no merit in any of the complaints and 
affirmed the conviction. This article 
addresses Craig's complaint that "the 
coun erred in allowing the children to tes-
tify on closed circuit television" in viola-
tion of the sixth amendment's 
confrontation clause. Id. at 257, 544 A.2d 
at 786. 
The trial coun applied section 9-102 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Code in allowing Brooke and several 
other children to testify during the trial 
through closed circuit television. Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984). 
Section 9-102 provides that in a case of 
child abuse, the coun may allow a child's 
testimony taken outside the counroom in 
a child abuse trial if "(i) the testimony is 
taken during the proceeding and (ii) the 
judge determines that the child testifying 
in the counroom will result in the child 
suffering serious emotional distress such 
that the child cannot reasonably commu-
nicate." Id. at 275, 544 A.2d at 786. Craig's 
complaint was in effect a three-part issue. 
She contended that section 9-102 "vio-
late[d] her Constitutional right of confron-
tation; (2) the coun failed to follow the 
proper procedure in concluding that the 
children would suffer serious emotional 
distress such that they would be unable to 
reasonably communicate if required to tes-
tify in coun; and (3) '" § 9-102 ... vio-
lated her right of presence." Id. 
The Craig trial court did not have the 
benefit of an appellate decision concerning 
the construction of section 9-102. Conse-
quently, the main thrust of Craig's attack 
focused on Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987), which was de-
cided after her verdicts were rendered. 
Wildermuth concerned a challenge that the 
procedure stated in section 9-102 contra-
vened a defendant's right of confrontation 
and presence. However, subsequent to 
Wildermuth, the U.S. Supreme Coun 
decided Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. __ ,108 
S. Ct. 2798 (1988), which also "addressed 
the confrontation issues raised by pr~ 
dures impairing face-to-face contact 
between child-witnesses and defendants on 
trial for having allegedly abused them." 76 
Md. App. at 275-76, 544 A.2d at 796. 
In Coy, the defendant was charged with 
having assaulted two 13-year old girls. The 
trial judge, without inquiring whether the 
assaulted children would be able to testify 
in Coy's presence and acting pursuant to a 
recently enacted state statute, permitted a 
semi-opaque screen to be placed in the 
courtroom between the witness stand and 
Coy. Coy was able to dimly see the 
witnesses but the witnesses were not able 
to see him. The state had sought to justify 
the procedure on the ground that there 
was a legislatively imposed presumption of 
trauma, thereby avoiding a specific finding 
of necessity for separating the victims 
from the defendant. The state also argued 
that there was no violation of Coy's right 
to confrontation since his right of cross-
examination was left intact. Id. 
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme 
Court's majority decision that rejected the 
state's two arguments. The Court held that 
the right of confrontation required more 
than just the ability to cross-examine but 
also included the right to meet one's accus-
er face-to-face. Additionally, the Coun 
rejected the state's contention that its sta-
tute could, on its own, supply the necessi-
ty, and stressed the lack of individualized 
findings. Nevertheless, the Court did not 
completely rule out exceptions to this find-
ing, but simply stated that the question of 
whether any exceptions may exist would 
have to wait for another day. Id. at 27&-77, 
544 A.2d at 797. In the concurring opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor made clear, howev-
er, that the face-to-face confrontation 
requirement was "not absolute but rather 
may give way ... to other competing 
interests so as to permit the use of certain 
procedural devices to shield a child witness 
from the trauma of courtroom testi-
mony." Id. at 278, 544 A.2d at 797-98 
(quoting Coy, __ U.S. at -> 108 S. Ct. 
at 2803). 
The Craig court concluded that the Coy 
Court did not firmly rule out exceptions 
to the face-to-face confrontation clause 
requirement nor did it rule out as an excep-
tion a state's interest in protecting child-
witnesses from being traumatized while 
testifying in a courtroom in the presence of 
the defendant. The court noted that, even 
though Justice Scalia's opinion may have 
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